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INTRODUCTION

As drug overdoses in Illinois have been steadily increasing over the
last decade, officials have begun looking at every method for trying to curb
this dramatic increase.1 In their search for a solution, state officials and law
enforcement came across Illinois’s Drug-Induced Homicide Statute—a law
rarely charged since its enactment over two decades ago.2 In the 1980s,
America was not only on the brink of war with the Soviet Union, but was
also fully engaged in a new type of war: the War on Drugs.3 In 1988, Illinois decided to ramp up its own fight against drugs by passing the DrugInduced Homicide Act.4 By allowing Illinois courts to impose additional
incarceration time for drug deliveries resulting in death, the new law was an
attempt to introduce another tool against drug dealing. 5 As charges and
convictions of drug-induced homicide increase, it is prudent to fully analyze the breadth, vagueness, and necessity of the statute.6
This Comment will analyze the law itself, why the law was passed,
what gap the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute fills compared to other homicide and murder statutes Illinois has in place, comparable laws in other
states, and how the law has been interpreted by the Illinois courts. Furthermore, this Comment will seek to bring to light how the Illinois courts have
incorrectly interpreted the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute by allowing
potential liability for a death to last forever and to trigger no matter how the
death occurred.7 Despite the current holdings of the Illinois courts, there are
solutions to interpret the law in a manner that would be consistent with Illi-

1. Jessica Reichert, Prescription Drug Abuse, Accidental Overdose on Rise in
Illinois, 8 ILL. CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTHORITY RES. BULL., June 2011, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/Bulletins/Prescription_drugs_062011.pdf (stating that
unintentional drug overdoses have increased forty-nine percent between 1999 and 2007).
2. See Jim Salter & Jim Suhr, A Shift to More Aggressive Tactics Against Heroin,
CNS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/shift-more-aggressive-tacticsagainst-heroin.
3. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1985).
4. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
5. See id.
6. See Salter & Suhr, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); see also 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
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nois law and with the intent of the legislature to curb deaths resulting from
illegally controlled substances.8
II.

THE ILLINOIS DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE AND ITS
HISTORY

The late 1980s saw a large increase in drug use, and state governments
all across the United States were attempting to find solutions in order to
battle what was deemed as an epidemic sweeping the nation.9 One solution
adopted by Illinois and a handful of other states was to enact laws that
would drastically increase punishment for drug crimes resulting in death.10
Illinois enacted the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute, which states:
(a) A person who violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully
delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person’s death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance, commits the offense of drug-induced homicide.11
In order to get a full understanding of the law, it is important to also understand what constitutes a violation of section 401 of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) or section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and
Community Protection Act (MCCPA).12 Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act states:
Except as authorized by this Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture or deliver, or possess with
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance
other than methamphetamine . . . . Examples of chemical
classes . . . include, but are not limited to, the following:
phenethylamines, N-substituted piperidines, morphinans,
8. See, e.g., Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011);
Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois House of Representatives, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Sess.,
May
20,
1988,
at
190-94,
available
at
http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans85/HT052088.pdf.
9. Deaths from cocaine between 1984 and 1986 increased 88% (from 666 to
1,253), and between the years 1984 and 1987 hospital emergency room visits related to
cocaine use increased 371% (from 7,054 to 26,186). Thomas N. Osran, Illinois’ Drug Induced Homicide Statute: A Tough State Just Got Tougher, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 537 (1989)
(citing Nat’l Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Comm., 1987 Report 27 (April 1988)).
10. See Osran, supra note 9, at 538-40.
11. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
12. Id.
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ecgonines, quinazolinones,
arylcycloalkylamines.13

substituted

indoles,

and

In addition to the drugs listed in the CSA, section 55 of the MCCPA uses
similar language to include methamphetamine amongst the illegal drugs for
delivery, manufacturing, or possession.14 It is important to note both the
Controlled Substance Act and the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act utilize “knowingly” as the mens rea, which would later
be adopted by the courts for the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute.15
Finally, a violation of the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute is considered a Class X felony punishable by between fifteen to thirty years of imprisonment, or thirty to sixty years if an extended term applies.16 Therefore,
if a jury finds a defendant guilty of drug-induced homicide, there is little
room for a judge to take mitigating factors into account since the minimum
sentence he could impose is fifteen years of imprisonment, whereas the
underlying drug charge most likely would have allowed for a significantly
shorter sentence.17
III.

OTHER ILLINOIS MURDER/HOMICIDE STATUTES

In order for the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute to have a place in Illinois law, it needs to fill a gap in the Illinois homicide and murder laws. 18
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the current state of Illinois’s laws on
homicide and murder and determine if the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute
is necessary, and if so, what type of homicides or murders the legislature
sought to ensure would be covered.19
13. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/401 (2010).
14. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 646/55
(2010) (“It is unlawful knowingly to engage in the delivery or possession with the intent to
deliver methamphetamine or a substance containing methamphetamine.”).
15. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 646/55 (2010);
see also Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
16. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011). This section states:
(b) Sentence. Drug-induced homicide is a Class X felony.
(c) A person who commits drug-induced homicide by violating subsection (a) or subsection (c) of Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act commits a Class X felony for which the defendant
shall in addition to a sentence authorized by law, be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years or
an extended term of not less than 30 years and not more than 60 years.
Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1, -2, -3 (2010).
19. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2010); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1, 2, -3 (2010).
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ILLINOIS’S FIRST DEGREE MURDER STATUTE

Illinois is unique in the sense it uses only one statute to encompass the
mental states of intent and knowledge, as well as to include the felony murder doctrine.20 The underlying foundation for first degree murder in Illinois
occurs when “[a] person . . . kills an individual without lawful justification .
. . in performing the acts which cause the death.”21
The statute then lists the three methods in which the death can occur in
order for the person to commit first degree murder.22 The first method utilizes the mental state of purpose by stating a person commits first degree
murder if “he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual
or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or
another.”23 The second method involves the mental state of knowledge,
which occurs when a person “knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another.”24 Third, the
statute includes what is commonly known as felony murder, or when the
death occurs as the result of a person “attempting or committing a forcible
felony other than second degree murder.”25 First degree murder in Illinois
has a penalty of imprisonment between twenty years and life.26
B.

ILLINOIS’S SECOND DEGREE MURDER STATUTE

Illinois uses its Second Degree Murder Statute as an extension of the
First Degree Murder Statute,27 in that “[a] person commits the offense of
second degree murder when he or she commits the offense of first degree
murder . . . and either of the following mitigating factors are present.”28 The
statute then continues on to list two possible situations when a person’s
actions in committing what would normally be first degree murder would
instead constitute second degree murder29:
(1) at the time of the killing he or she is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
by the individual killed or another whom the offender en-

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2010).
Id.
Id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)(1) (2010).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)(2) (2010).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2010).
Id.
Id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (2010).
Id.

36

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 4

deavors to kill, but he or she negligently or accidentally
causes the death of the individual killed; or
(2) at the time of the killing he or she believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in . . . this
Code, but his or her belief is unreasonable.30
When a person in Illinois is found guilty of second degree murder (considered a Class 1 felony) the penalty is imprisonment with a minimum of four
years and a maximum of twenty years.31
C.

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND RECKLESS HOMICIDE

The last important Illinois statute dealing with murder or homicide
deals with actions that fall under the mental state of recklessness or negligence.32 The Illinois law defining involuntary manslaughter and reckless
homicide reads:
A person who unintentionally kills an individual without
lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if
his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death
are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to
some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except
in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle. . . . A person commits reckless
homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an individual
while driving a vehicle and using an incline . . . to cause the
vehicle to become airborne.33
The penalty imposed for both reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter (considered a Class 3 felony) is imprisonment with a minimum
sentence of two years and a maximum sentence of five years.34
D.

SUMMARY AND COMPARISONS OF THE ILLINOIS MURDER AND
HOMICIDE STATUTES

Comparing these laws with the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute
demonstrates that Illinois was most likely trying to increase the penalty for
30. Id. (“Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a
reasonable person.”).
31. Id.
32. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3 (2010).
33. Id.
34. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-40 (2010).

2012]

ILLINOIS’S DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE

37

drug crimes resulting in death beyond what already existed in the Illinois
Criminal Code.35 Since two parts of the First Degree Murder Statute require
either purposeful or knowing intent, it is extremely unlikely the courts
would interpret the regular delivery or sale of drugs as reaching that high
level of intent.36 Furthermore, felony murder in Illinois requires the underlying felony to be a forcible felony, and the Illinois courts have never interpreted the delivery of a controlled substance as “forcible.”37
Of all the other Illinois statutes dealing with murder, only first degree
murder carries a stiffer penalty than the drug-induced homicide law.38
Based solely on the length of imprisonment, it would appear the Illinois
legislature determined there were higher societal concerns regarding the
illegal delivery of controlled substances that resulted in someone’s intended
or unintended death than of a person committing any of the following
crimes: impassioned first degree murder, wrongful belief that first degree
murder was justifiable, reckless homicide, or unintentional killing of someone through actions that are likely to cause death or great harm.39 Essentially, someone pulling out a firearm and killing another person during a bar
fight would serve less time under Illinois law than someone giving their
spouse a single ecstasy pill, and the spouse dying from having an allergic
reaction to the ecstasy.40
Since the elements for drug-induced homicide are unique,41 the other
Illinois statutes on murder or homicide do not constitute lesser-included
offenses.42 Illinois has also determined that if a defendant is found guilty of
multiple murder/homicide statutes, the court is to only enter in the charge
with the highest culpable state, and dismiss the remaining charges.43 The
Illinois courts have also determined drug-induced homicide is more culpa35. Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois House of Representatives, 85th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess., May 20, 1988, at 190-94. Representative Shaw addressed the assembly
stating, “as you know, what we have had is an awful amount of problems with drugs, the
sale of drugs and a lot of deaths as a result of drugs and I believe that this piece of legislation
would answer some of the problems that we have had.” Id. at 191.
36. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2010).
37. 21 ILL. LAW AND PRAC. HOMICIDE § 7. For a more detailed definition of forcible
felonies, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (2010).
38. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-20 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
39. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2, -3, -3.3 (2010); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.530, -40 (2010).
40. See Illinois v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 110 (Ill. 1995) (listing reasonable provocation to constitute second degree murder including “mutual combat”).
41. Illinois v. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“The drug
induced homicide statute is a unique statute that imposes criminal responsibility for the
death of a person on anyone in the chain of delivery of controlled substances that were the
cause of that person’s death.”).
42. See id.
43. See Illinois v. Kuntu, 752 N.E.2d 380, 395 (Ill. 2001).
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ble than involuntary manslaughter based solely on the fact that the former is
a Class X felony, and the latter, a Class 3 felony.44 Therefore, even if the
death were to occur from the knowing delivery of the controlled substance
as a result of negligence or recklessness, the perpetrator would be subject to
the higher penalty of drug-induced homicide.45
In summary, it appears as though the Illinois legislature was not content including illegal delivery of controlled substances within the scope of
felony murder, and, instead, deemed delivery of a controlled substance resulting in a death, no matter how the death came about, more serious than
all other forms of murder (except first degree murder).46 The legislature
passed the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute with a higher term of imprisonment upon conviction despite the fact the courts had and could continue to
construe the delivery of drugs as reckless behavior, thus allowing the conviction of involuntary manslaughter.47 Based on the length of imprisonment
imposed for violating the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute,48 the Illinois
legislature appears to have deemed the illegal delivery of controlled substances to be so serious it was necessary for the increased punishment as
compared to other forms of murder and homicide.49
IV.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE LAW IN
ILLINOIS

Despite the twenty-three years the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute has
been on the books in Illinois, the issue of its validity has never made it to
the Illinois Supreme Court and has only been considered by the appellate
courts on three occasions.50 The issue was also briefly addressed in federal
court on one occasion in Illinois’s Northern District in United States ex rel.
Faircloth v. Sternes.51

44. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 397. Although the court does not discuss the levels of
culpability between the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute and the other Illinois murder/homicide statutes, it can most likely be presumed that the level of culpability is determined based on classification of the felony. Therefore, only a first degree murder conviction
would carry precedence over a drug-induced homicide conviction. See id.
45. See id.
46. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
47. See, e.g., Illinois v. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
48. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
49. See id.
50. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d 1356; Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367; Faircloth v. Sternes, 853
N.E.2d 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
51. United States ex rel. Faircloth v. Sternes, No. 00 C 1346, 2000 WL 1847627
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2000).
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THE COURT’S FIRST TIME ADDRESSING THE DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE
STATUTE—ILLINOIS V. FAIRCLOTH (1992)

Illinois v. Faircloth was the first time the Drug-Induced Homicide
Statute was addressed by any of the Illinois courts at the appellate level.52
In Faircloth, three friends (Faircloth and two female friends) engaged in
heavy cocaine usage over a three-day period.53 Ultimately, one of the female friends died after a seizure resulting from the drug use.54 All three
friends had used cocaine on numerous occasions prior to this event.55 Faircloth provided the cocaine that caused his friend’s death on this occasion by
stealing it from a drug dealer all three had previously used to obtain cocaine.56 Faircloth was found guilty of drug-induced homicide and possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance and sentenced to fifteen years for the homicide and fifteen years for the possession to be served
consecutively.57
On appeal, the court noted the defendant failed to raise any issue “as to
the validity of the statute.”58 Since the defendant, however, did raise the
issue of whether involuntary manslaughter was a lesser-included offense to
drug-induced homicide, the court analyzed the statute solely for the purpose
of determining the mental state necessary to commit drug-induced homicide.59 The court determined “[t]he mental state in this statute is ‘knowingly,’ which comes from Section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act of
1971.”60 Furthermore, the court went on to hold, “[t]he defendant just needs
to make a knowing delivery of a controlled substance, and if any person
then dies as a result of taking that substance, the defendant is responsible
for that person’s death.”61 This essentially meant there was no mental state
required of the defendant in causing the death of the victim, just simply that
he had knowingly delivered the controlled substance resulting in her
death.62

52. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d at 1362 (“We could find no other cases in this jurisdiction
involving the drug induced homicide statute . . . .”).
53. Id. at 1358.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d at 1358-59.
57. Id. at 1357-58.
58. Id. at 1362.
59. Id. at 1360.
60. Id.
61. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d at 1360.
62. See id.
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THE ONLY FEDERAL CASE TO DISCUSS THE DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE
STATUTE—UNITED STATES EX REL. FAIRCLOTH V. STERNES (2000)

United States ex rel. Faircloth v. Sternes represents the federal appeal
from the same defendant, Faircloth, in the previous case regarding his conviction.63 In this appeal, Faircloth attempted to raise the issue of the statute’s validity based on its vagueness.64 The court dismissed Faircloth’s
claim without analysis of the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute’s constitutionality because after the circuit court dismissed the first appeal, Faircloth
“failed to pursue the claim in subsequent appeals.”65 This proved fatal for
Faircloth in this appeal because “petitioners must pursue their federal
claims to the highest level of state review” before being taken up on appeal
by the federal courts.66 Because of Faircloth’s mistake, the issue regarding
the validity of the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute was once again avoided.67
C.

THE FIRST CASE TO FULLY ADDRESS THE DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE
STATUTE’S VALIDITY—ILLINOIS V. BOAND (2005)

In Illinois v. Boand, the state appellate court finally gave a full analysis to the statute’s validity, addressing a multitude of issues including:
overbreadth, vagueness, legislative intent, and foreseeability of death.68 The
facts of this case display a fatal flaw in the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute,
that is, the statute does not take into account that the deceased individual
may have been suicidal and simply using drugs as the method to end their
own life.69 Furthermore, it extends the foreseeability of a person’s death
beyond traditional court holdings in the past.70
Boand dealt with a group of four friends (two female and two male),
including the defendant, Boand, and the deceased, Levin.71 Levin had a
history of substance abuse, and in the three months prior to her death, had
been hospitalized on four separate occasions for attempting suicide and
overdosing on drugs and alcohol.72 In fact, two days before Levin’s death,
she had attended a drug party, where Boand was not present, and ingested
63. United States ex rel. Faircloth v. Sternes, No. 00 C 1346, 2000 WL 1847627
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2000).
64. Id. at *3.
65. Id. at *5.
66. Id.
67. See Sternes, 2000 WL 1847627.
68. Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 376.
72. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 375.
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cocaine, marijuana, and muscle relaxers.73 Levin became intoxicated to the
point that she drove her vehicle off the road crashing into a tree, destroying
her new car, and requiring hospitalization for her injuries.74
Levin’s friend testified that on the day of her death, Levin stated she
had “nothing left to live for.”75 Prior to meeting up with the defendant that
evening, Levin and her friend smoked marijuana and ingested Vicodin.76 As
the party moved to Boand’s home, Levin began strongly expressing her
desire for cocaine.77 Boand then presented four bottles, one for each person,
of methadone, which had been prescribed to him to help treat his heroin
addiction.78 One of the four drank only about half of the bottle placed in
front of her, which Levin then grabbed and consumed in addition to her
own bottle.79 Following the consumption of the methadone, Levin became
upset and demanded more drugs, specifically crack cocaine.80 At this point
Boand and one female, not Levin, left the party while Levin remained in the
house with the other male.81 Levin had sexual intercourse with the other
male, and then an hour later proceeded to pass out on the couch.82 When
Boand returned to the house, instead of calling the paramedics, they unsuccessfully attempted to revive Levin in a cold shower.83 The forensic pathology report indicated Levin died from a combination of cocaine and methadone intoxication.84
Boand was charged and convicted of drug-induced homicide, involuntary manslaughter, and criminal sexual assault.85 On appeal, Boand chal73. Id. at 376.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 376.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 376-77.
82. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 377. There is some conflicting testimony as to whether
Levin continued to consume more drugs, including more of Boand’s methadone, between
the five hours that Boand was away from the house. Id. The inconsistent testimony suggests
that Levin may have found more of Boand’s methadone and drank that in addition to what
she had already smoked and consumed earlier. Id.
83. Id. at 377.
84. Id. at 378. The facts of the case make it unclear when or where Levin had ingested the cocaine that was found in her system, but none of the testimony suggests that
Boand was present when she did. Id.
85. Id. at 378-79. Boand was sentenced concurrently to twenty years on the druginduced homicide charge, five years on the involuntary manslaughter charge, and eleven
years on the criminal sexual assault charge. Id. The drug-induced homicide and involuntary
manslaughter charges are connected with Levin’s death, and the criminal sexual assault
charge is because he allegedly unsuccessfully attempted to have sexual intercourse with the
other female at the party while she was unconscious. Id.
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lenged the validity of the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute, contending it
was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.86 The court broke down the
analysis of the statute into two sections: overbreadth and vagueness (which
is then broken down into three broad sections: legislative intent, mental
state, and foreseeability of death).87
Boand’s challenge on overbreadth claimed the statute was designed to
target professional drug dealers.88 Boand argued that the trial court’s interpretation made anyone who may step into the chain of delivery criminally
liable, thus making the statute too wide-reaching.89 The court dismissed this
argument stating that overbreadth arguments are designed for protections
within the First Amendment, and that Boand made no allegations his First
Amendment rights were being violated.90
Moving forward, the court then addressed Boand’s argument the
Drug-Induced Homicide Statute was too vague.91 The court analyzed the
legislative intent of the statute to determine who the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute was intended to target.92 The court dismissed Boand’s argument that the statute was designed to target drug dealers, stating if the legislature wanted to only target drug dealers it would have put language to that
effect into the statute, instead of just referring to delivery.93 Next, the court
86. Id. at 398.
87. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 398-402.
88. Id. at 398-99.
89. Id.
90. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 399-400. A vagueness argument challenges that a statute
would be incapable of providing a normal person with enough information to be able to
determine if their conduct would be lawful or unlawful. See Illinois v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d
545 (Ill. 2000). Furthermore, for Boand to succeed in his vagueness argument the application
of the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute must have been overly vague to his specific circumstances. See Illinois v. Warren, 671 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1996).
92. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 399-400.
93. Id. Although this Comment will not go into detail regarding the legislative intent, the analysis may not be as black and white as the Boand court seems to imply. During
the floor debate, Representative McCracken warned “any lobbyist listening who represents .
. . criminal defendants [to] stay out of the House.” Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois
House of Representatives, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., May 18, 1988, at 43, available at
http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans85/HT051888.pdf. When the bill came up in
front of the House two days later, Representative Countryman argued that the law was
“inartfully written and probably will cause nothing but Constitutional problems in the courts.
Its [sic] unclear. . . . I’m not opposed . . . to . . . becoming tough on drug dealers. . . . But this
is a bad law, bad legislation and isn’t drafted accurately and it’s unconstitutional and will do
nothing but create problems . . . .” Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois House of Representatives, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., May 20, 1988, at 191-92. The House approved
the bill, and in the Senate there was additional conversation regarding the statute’s intention
to target drug dealers by Senator Geo-Karis:
[A] bill of this nature . . . does provide that the manufacturer or dealer
who delivers an illegally controlled substance to another responsible for
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addressed the mental state, or lack thereof, in the Drug-Induced Homicide
Statute.94 Ultimately, the court referred back to the holding in Faircloth that
the mental state was implied by the legislature and intended to be knowingly in regards to the delivery of the controlled substance.95 The Boand court
addressed the mental state for the actual death by comparing it to felony
murder, holding “[j]ust as the felony murder statute imposes criminal liability for a death resulting from a forcible felony, the drug-induced-homicide
statute imposes criminal liability for a death resulting from the knowing
delivery of certain controlled substances.”96
Finally, the court used the same comparison with felony murder in order to link the foreseeability of the victim’s death to any individual in the
chain of delivery that would fall under Illinois’s proximate cause theory.97
The proximate cause theory applies to Illinois’s felony murder law through
the holding in Illinois v. Lowery, where the court held “liability attaches
under the felony-murder rule for any death proximately resulting from the
unlawful activity—notwithstanding the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime.”98 The court went on further to explain, “when a felon’s
attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events which
were or should have been within his contemplation . . . he should be held
responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence
results from the initial criminal act.”99
The court affirmed the conviction of drug-induced homicide, adding it
did not matter that Boand “did not ‘encourage’ Levin to ingest the methadone . . . . [T]he evidence presented is sufficient to sustain the conviction
because the State was required to prove only that defendant’s delivery of
methadone was ‘knowing.’”100
the death of any person resulting from the use of that illegal drug can be
penalized with a Class X felony. . . . It’s high time we got after these
miserable drug pushers who’ve made a . . . travesty of the lives of young
people.
Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois Senate, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., June 24,
1988, at 92-94, available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans85/ST062488.pdf.
The statute was further discussed by Senator D’Arco, stating, “I want to get these drug pushers off the street just like you guys . . . [but] [t]his is a terrible bill, but like all these terrible
bills that involve the Criminal Code, this bill will pass just like the rest of them.” Id. at 9394.
94. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 400-01; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
95. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 400; Illinois v. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d 1356 (Ill. App.
1992).
96. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 400-01.
97. Id. at 401 (citing Illinois v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1998), for the proximate cause element).
98. Illinois v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975-76 (Ill. 1997).
99. Id. at 976.
100. Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 402.
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THE FINAL AND MOST RECENT TIME THE ILLINOIS COURTS HAVE
ADDRESSED THE DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE—FAIRCLOTH V.
STERNES (2006)

Faircloth returned for another appeal, this time attempting to challenge
the constitutionality of the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute based on the
premise the statute imposes a murder-type punishment without requiring a
murder-type mens rea.101 Faircloth also attempted to argue the statute additionally violated the Illinois Constitution based on the ProportionatePenalties Clause.102
The holding for this case is essentially a reiteration of the court’s findings a year earlier in Boand.103 The court stated it was foreseeable that a
person could die from the delivery of drugs and suggesting otherwise was
“contrary to common experience . . . [and] contrary to the spirit of numerous Illinois laws that criminalize the sale, delivery and use of illegal
drugs.”104 Finally, the court also rejected the proportionality argument because the penalty imposed by the statute did not “shock the moral sense of
the community” considering a person died as a result of Faircloth’s actions.105
Considering the same appellate court had written the holding for
Boand less than a year prior to this case, it was little surprise the court refused to find Boand wrongly decided.106 Faircloth was the last time any
Illinois court has addressed the validity of the Drug-Induced Homicide
Statute.107
V.
AN ANALYSIS OF ILLINOIS’S MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR
STATUTES AND HOW THEY RELATE TO THE DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE
STATUTE
Illinois has specific requirements for its statutes in regards to the mental state of a defendant, as described in the Illinois Compiled Statutes: “(a)
A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves
absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the
statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states
described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.”108
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Faircloth v. Sternes, 853 N.E.2d 878, 880-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
Id. at 881.
See id.; see also Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367.
Faircloth, 853 N.E.2d at 884.
Id.
See id.; see also Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367.
See Faircloth, 853 N.E.2d 878.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3 (2010).
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Sections 4-4 through 4-7 recite the four commonly known mental
states when it comes to criminal statutes: intent, knowledge, recklessness,
and negligence.109 In order for a statute to avoid any mental state by allowing for strict liability, Illinois requires the offense cannot be more serious
than a misdemeanor.110 Therefore, in order to comply with section (a) of the
statute, it was necessary for Illinois courts to find some form of mental state
to apply to the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute.111 This is likely why Illinois courts that addressed the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute held the
mental state of knowledge found within the Illinois Controlled Substance
Act also applies to drug-induced homicide.112
The Illinois statute also requires in section (b) that each element of a
statute is clearly defined with a mental state, or that a mental state of recklessness, knowledge, or intent may be assumed:
(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular
mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without
distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed
mental state applies to each such element. If the statute
does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an
element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 is applicable.113
While the courts may choose to interpret the necessary intent for the delivery of the controlled substance within the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute
as knowledge, there was clearly no mental state assigned to the death element of the statute.114
Based on the language of the Illinois statute, one clear option the Illinois courts had, but did not follow, was to interpret the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute by applying the knowledge mental state to each element of the
offense, both the delivery of the controlled substance as well as the resulting death.115 Furthermore, a second option based on the statute and other
previous court holdings of assigning a mental state of recklessness or higher
109. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-4 to -7 (2010).
110. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9 (2010).
111. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3 (2010). Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that it would not assume strict liability for statutes that did not have a prescribed
mental state. See, e.g., Illinois v. Anderson, 591 N.E.2d 461 (Ill. 1992).
112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/401 (2010); see,
e.g., Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
113. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3 (2010).
114. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
115. See, e.g., Illinois v. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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to the death element was also not utilized by the courts in Faircloth and
Boand.116 Instead of following either of the two paths described by statute,
the courts decided to compare the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute with
Illinois’s felony murder law.117
VI.

ILLINOIS’S FELONY MURDER STATUTE AND COMPARISONS TO
THE DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE

Illinois implemented the Felony Murder Statute118 in an attempt to limit the violence that often accompanies certain felonies by making a murder
conviction available to a person that killed someone while carrying out a
forcible felony.119 There are only two elements to Illinois’s felony murder
rule: “(1) that the defendant was a participant in a forcible felony; and (2)
that the victim was killed during the commission of the felony as a direct
and foreseeable consequence of it.”120 The courts have further interpreted
that the foreseeable consequence (as described in element two) follows the
proximate cause theory, a minority position with respect to other states’
felony murder interpretations.121 There are several stark differences that
become apparent when the appellate courts attempt to utilize components of
the Felony Murder Statute and apply them to the Drug-Induced Homicide
Statute.122
First, the Felony Murder Statute has almost always been regarded as
an exception to the rule.123 In fact, in virtually every felony criminal statute
in the country, and especially with regards to murder and homicide statutes,
there is a requirement for both an act and specified mental state.124 The Illinois courts have stated “[t]he offense of felony murder is unique because it
does not require the State to prove the intent to kill.”125 This aspect alone
makes it rather unlikely the Illinois legislature contemplated the Drug116. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3 (2010). See also, e.g., Illinois v. Gean, 573 N.E.2d
818, 822 (Ill. 1991) (stating that when an Illinois statute does not prescribe a mental state,
“then either intent, knowledge or recklessness applies”).
117. See, e.g., Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367.
118. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2010).
119. See, e.g., Illinois v. Schmidt, 924 N.E.2d 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Illinois v.
Graham, 791 N.E.2d 724 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
120. Illinois v. Milka, 783 N.E.2d 51, 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
121. See, e.g., Illinois v. Ruiz, 795 N.E.2d 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). Most states follow the agency theory instead of the proximate cause theory. See James W. Hilliard, Felony
Murder in Illinois—the “Agency Theory” vs. the “Proximate Cause Theory”: The Debate
Continues, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 331 (2001).
122. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1, -3.3 (2010).
123. See Osran, supra note 9, at 544.
124. See id.
125. Illinois v. Davison, 923 N.E.2d 781, 785-86 (Ill. 2010).
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Induced Homicide Statute would be analogous to the characteristics of felony murder.126
Second, based on Illinois courts’ expression of the uniqueness of the
statute, it seems unlikely the Illinois Supreme Court would extend felony
murder characteristics to non-forcible felonies, such as the delivery of a
controlled substance.127 The Illinois Supreme Court has expressly stated
felony murder is not supposed to be treated the same way as any other statute because “[i]t is the inherent dangerousness of forcible felonies that differentiates them from nonforcible felonies.”128 It would seem if the Illinois
legislature wanted drug-induced homicide to follow in the path of felony
murder, it would have stated so clearly or simply expanded the statute on
felony murder to include controlled substance deliveries as forcible felonies.129 In fact, there is no reference to felony murder in either the Illinois
House or Senate debates when the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute was
passed.130
Third, under Illinois’s Felony Murder Statute, the killing resulting in
the charge must occur during the commission of a forcible felony.131 Therefore, an individual’s risk of committing felony murder has a specific ending
point, which is the same moment the forcible felony comes to an end.132 On
the other hand, in regards to drug-induced homicide, the courts have stated
after the knowing delivery of a controlled substance, the deliverer commits
the offense at any point in time any person dies as a result of the controlled
substance.133 In effect, the person delivering the drugs could violate the
statute the same day as delivering the drugs, a year later, ten years later, or
perhaps even fifty years later, since there is no ending point in time for the
potential liability of any person dying as a result of the controlled substance.134 The statute of limitations under the current Drug-Induced Homicide Statute would also not prevent potential unlimited exposure to criminal
liability because the statute would not be violated until the victim died, and
thus, the statute of limitations could potentially not arise for months or
years after the delivery of a controlled substance.135 It seems unlikely the
legislative intent for the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute was for every per126. See id.
127. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973 (Ill. 1997).
128. Id. at 977.
129. See id.
130. Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois House of Representatives, 85th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess., May 20, 1988, at 190-94; Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois
Senate, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., June 24, 1988, at 92-95.
131. See, e.g., Illinois v. Hall, 683 N.E.2d 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
132. Id.
133. See Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
134. See id.
135. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
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son participating in the chain of delivery, no matter how small, of a controlled substance to be exposed to potential criminal liability for eternity.136
Fourth, under the Felony Murder Statute “the defendant [must have]
acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge
that his acts created a strong possibility of death or great bodily harm to the
murdered individual or another.”137 Studies have shown an individual using
heroin, an arguably more dangerous drug than methadone, only has a
0.00035% chance of dying as a result of each individual injection.138 Since
the court in Boand interpreted the mere delivery of a controlled substance
as an act creating the strong possibility of death, virtually every circumstance involving the delivery of a controlled substance where a person dies
would violate the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute.139 This means in the
following hypothetical situations there would be a violation of the DrugInduced Homicide Statute, and those mentioned would be liable for between fifteen and thirty years in prison.140
1. A husband and wife have been using heroin together daily for a decade, and due to a drug dealer supplying a bad batch of heroin, the wife
dies after injecting herself. Not only is the drug dealer liable for her
death, but the husband would be as well if he happened to pick up the
heroin that particular morning.
2. Person A sells marijuana to Person B, who goes home and smokes a
small quantity of the marijuana. Person B, while high, decides to end
his life and jumps out the window resulting in his death. Person A
would be liable for his death since Person B may not have jumped had
he not been under the influence.
3. Person A gives a friend some marijuana at a party. Four months later the friend smokes some of the marijuana and gets into a car accident
while high, killing a person in another vehicle. Not only is the friend
liable for the death, but so is Person A for delivering the marijuana to
the friend.
4. Twenty people are in a row together attending a rock concert. The
first person pulls out a baggy of ecstasy pills, takes one, and passes the
136. See id.
137. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(6)(b) (2010).
138. Osran, supra note 9 (citing Lynne H. Rambo, Note, An Unconstitutional Fiction: The Felony-Murder Rule as Applied to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L .REV. 671, 689
(1986)).
139. See Boand, 838 N.E.2d at 401-02.
140. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
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bag down the line. Out of the twenty people, only four actually consume an ecstasy pill. The twentieth person in the row has an allergic
reaction and dies. Not only is the first person liable, but so are the other eighteen people in the row for knowingly delivering the ecstasy to
the next person in line. Each of the nineteen people, even those that did
not even take a pill, could be found guilty of drug-induced homicide
and sentenced to up to thirty years in prison.
While these may just be hypothetical situations, any of them could easily
occur, again raising the question as to what degree the legislature wanted to
extend the liability for committing drug-induced homicide.141
If the Illinois legislature had intended for drug-induced homicide to
accept characteristics from the Felony Murder Statute, it would have addressed and detailed to what extent liability would apply.142 Since the Illinois legislature was silent beyond relating drug-induced homicide to the
unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, it seems unlikely the legislature
intended for the statute to apply in the same context as felony murder. 143
Therefore, the Boand court altered the intent of the legislature by allowing a
mens rea to apply only to the delivery of the controlled substance and not to
the death.144
VII.

COMPARING ILLINOIS’S DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE TO
SIMILAR LAWS IN OTHER STATES

When the War on Drugs was running rampant through the 1980s,145 Illinois was not the only state legislature that sought to bring harsher punishments to crimes involving the delivery of drugs that resulted in death.146
Many states across the nation looked to combat the influx of drug-related
crimes through new criminal statutes, and some, like Illinois, focused on
attempting to prevent deaths caused by illegal controlled substances.147 Although Illinois has recently started to see an increase in drug-induced homi141. Transcript of Debates, H.B. 4125, Illinois House of Representatives, 85th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess., May 20, 1988, at 190-94.
142. See Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1985).
146. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:35-9 (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 69.50.415 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2011).
147. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:35-9 (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 69.50.415 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2011).
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cide charges, other states have still seen very little case law, if any, regarding their similar drug-induced homicide laws.148 Therefore, even though
many states have similar laws to Illinois’s law on the books, only a handful
of them have been addressed by their courts.149
A.

COMPARING WYOMING’S DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE TO
ILLINOIS’S DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE

Whereas the Illinois Drug-Induced Homicide Statute leaves liability
open to the deliverer of the controlled substance no matter who receives the
drugs and no matter who dies as a result, the Wyoming statute seeks to
reign in the vast liability presented in the Illinois statute by requiring that
the death is a result from the “unlawful[] deliver[y] [of] a controlled substance to a minor and that minor dies as a result . . . of that controlled substance.”150 Additionally, the maximum punishment for the Wyoming statute
is for “imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty . . .
years.”151 While the Wyoming law does not fully address the confusion that
is caused by a lack of mens rea, it does remedy the issues with the Illinois
law by dealing with extending the liability past the recipient of the controlled substance as well as requiring the victim be a minor to prevent scenarios where grown adults who are married or friends may end up liable for
the other’s death despite the drug usage being undertaken together.152
B.

COMPARING NEW JERSEY’S DRUG-INDUCED DEATH STATUTE TO
ILLINOIS’S DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE

In New Jersey, the legislature clearly set forth that the death resulting
from the delivery of a controlled substance was a strict liability offense in
its Drug-Induced Death Statute, which states “[a]ny person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses . . . any . . . controlled substance . . . is strictly
liable for a death which results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of
that substance, and is guilty of the crime of the first degree.”153
For New Jersey’s statute, unlike the Illinois version, the mens rea, or
lack thereof, was specifically written to make the deliverer of the controlled
substance strictly liable for any death that occurs.154 The strict liability ele148. For example, the only case that has made it to the appellate court level in New
Jersey is State v. Ervin, 577 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), and no cases have
yet been addressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
149. Id.
150. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2011).
151. Id.
152. See id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2011).
154. Id.
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ment has been upheld by the New Jersey superior courts because it was
clearly written that way by the legislature and is still “limited . . . to deaths
which are the proximate consequences of inherently dangerous illegal activities.”155 Although a strict liability theory may work for the New Jersey
version of the statute,156 Illinois courts would err if they were to make the
same holding because of the Illinois statute regarding strict liability, which
states no crime may be considered a strict liability offense if it is greater
than a misdemeanor.157
While the official interpretation by Illinois courts is that the DrugInduced Homicide Statute follows the proximate cause theory seen most
prominently in felony murder, there seems to be little contrast between this
interpretation and strict liability because, under either theory, the actor’s
mental state is irrelevant.158 The key difference between the two druginduced homicide statutes is that the New Jersey statute has much more
clarity and complies with the other state laws, whereas the Illinois law does
not fit in with the current laws and is forbidden from being interpreted as a
strict liability offense because of another state law.159
C.

COMPARING PENNSYLVANIA’S DRUG DELIVERY RESULTING IN DEATH
STATUTE TO ILLINOIS’S DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTE

Of all the states that have a law similar to Illinois’s Drug-Induced
Homicide Statute, Pennsylvania has the most case law addressing the constitutionality of these types of statutes.160 In part, this is because the original
version of the Pennsylvania statute was held unconstitutional in the case
Pennsylvania v. Highhawk, and therefore, the law needed to be reworked
and reanalyzed to ensure the new law was constitutionally sound.161 Initially, the Pennsylvania statute read similarly to the Illinois version: “[a] person
commits murder of the third degree who administers, dispenses, delivers,
gives, prescribes, sells, or distributes any controlled substance or counterfeit
controlled substance in violation of . . . [t]he Controlled Substance, Drug,

155. See State v. Ervin, 577 A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
156. See id.
157. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9 (2010).
158. See, e.g., Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
159. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2011); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/93.3 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9 (2010).
160. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005); Pennsylvania v.
Nahavandian, 849 A.2d 1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), vacated, 888 A.2d 815 (Pa. 2006);
Pennsylvania v. Highhawk, 687 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
161. The original version of the statute was found unconstitutional in Highhawk, 687
A.2d at 1129, and the revised version was then found constitutional in Nahavandian, 849
A.2d at 1228.
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Device and Cosmetic Act, and another person dies as a result of using the
substance.”162
The court in Highhawk found certain language in the statute dealing
with the sentencing requirements to be “unclear and ambiguous,” and held
the statute unconstitutional because the language did not “give reasonable
notice of the conduct which it proscribes to a person charged with violating
its interdiction.”163 Because the confusing language alone was sufficient to
find the statute unconstitutional, the court did not address the lack of the
mens rea requirement until the statute was rewritten by the legislature.164
Pennsylvania v. Nahavandian was the first case in which the Pennsylvania courts addressed the mens rea requirement of the current statute.165 In
this case, the defendant supplied heroin to a couple of people that were out
partying for the night, one of which died from overdosing.166 After the defendant was convicted under the statute, he appealed the conviction under
many theories, including that the statute was unconstitutional due to a lack
of a stated mens rea.167 Because the language of the statute refers to the
violation as “murder in the third degree,” the court applied the mens rea
required for other forms of murder in the third degree, which in Pennsylvania is malice.168 Since a finding of malice would be up to the fact finders of
the case, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction based on the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the necessary elements.169 Two years later, however, this conviction was vacated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for
consideration in light of its ruling in Pennsylvania v. Ludwig.170
Pennsylvania v. Ludwig was really the first time the Pennsylvania
courts directly and fully addressed the issue of mens rea.171 In this case, the
defendant was contacted and met up with fifteen-year-old, seventeen-yearold, and eighteen-year-old girls and sold them each a double-stacked pill of
ecstasy.172 After consuming the pills, the fifteen-year-old girl became violently ill and ultimately died due to an overdose.173 Initially, the trial court
held the statute was unconstitutionally vague because, based on the lan162. The language of the original version of the statute can be found in Highhawk,
687 A.2d at 1124.
163. Id. at 1125, 1127-28 (citing Pennsylvania v. Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (Pa.
1976)).
164. Id. at 1129; see also Nahavandian, 849 A.2d 1221.
165. Nahavandian, 849 A.2d 1221.
166. Id. at 1226.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1228.
169. Id. at 1233.
170. Pennsylvania v. Nahavandian, 888 A.2d 815 (Pa. 2006).
171. Pennsylvania v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005).
172. Id. at 626.
173. Id. at 627.
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guage of the statute, it was impossible to determine if the applicable mens
rea included malice or was intended to be a strict liability offense.174
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this finding based on two
reasons.175 First, the court stated the culpability requirement for third degree
murder has “consistently” been malice.176 Secondly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.177 The
court noted that “supplying an illegal and potentially dangerous substance
of unknown quality to another does not in and of itself support a finding of
malice.”178 The court went on to hold that supplying an illegal drug to a
minor (or anybody for that matter) that was potentially harmful without
knowing the recipient’s medical history to determine how the drug might
react in their system, providing a double dose of the drug, and receiving
money for the illegal drug was not enough evidence to establish a prima
facia case of malice in order to establish a finding of guilt.179
The Pennsylvania courts have gone on to interpret the statute as requiring the mental state of malice as opposed to strict liability (as held by the
New Jersey courts) or a comparison to felony murder (like Illinois’s interpretation of its Drug-Induced Homicide Statute).180 Pennsylvania has managed to balance increasing punishment to people who deliver an illegal controlled substance resulting in a person’s death with a statutory interpretation
adhering to the fundamental underlying principle of criminal law that a
person should be punished for his crime based on his mental culpability.181
D.

OVERVIEW OF HOW OTHER STATES HAVE WRITTEN OR INTERPRETED
THEIR STATUTES SIMILAR TO ILLINOIS’S DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE
STATUTE

Clearly, there is no consensus across the states as how to formulate
and interpret a law designed to additionally punish those who deliver a controlled substance when, as a result of that delivery, someone dies.182 The
Wyoming statute does not address the issue of mens rea, but does specify
that the deceased must have been the individual the controlled substance
174. Id. at 627-28.
175. Id.
176. Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 630.
177. Id. at 632.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 633-34.
180. See, e.g., Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623; see also Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005); State v. Ervin, 577 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
181. See, e.g., Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623.
182. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a
(West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506
(West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108
(West 2011).
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was delivered to in order for the crime to have been committed.183 In New
Jersey, the legislation relies on strict liability in regards to the death of anybody as a result of the delivery of the controlled substance.184 Finally,
Pennsylvania has held a mens rea of malice is required in order for a conviction to be maintained.185 Perhaps, in part, because there is little case law
in virtually every state regarding statutes dealing with drug-induced homicide, little consensus has developed across the country as to the best way to
design and interpret the appropriate statutes in order to increase the punishment for delivering a controlled substance resulting in another person’s
death.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

While the intent of the 1988 Illinois legislature was undoubtedly in the
right place when it passed the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute to curb drug
related deaths, the drafters of the statute’s language did a poor job writing a
law that was clear, understandable, and constitutional.186 While the statute
is quite clear that the delivery of the controlled substance must be knowingly, as found in the Controlled Substance Act, section 55, a mens rea requirement for death is entirely absent in the Illinois statute.187
The Illinois appellate courts have interpreted this lack of mens rea to
imply that the legislature drafted the statute with the intent for it to play out
similar to the felony murder doctrine, despite the complete absence of any
such language to that effect within the statute.188 Furthermore, in applying
the felony murder doctrine to the statute, it has the effect of broadening the
statute to apply to any knowing delivery of an illegally controlled substance
that, no matter how, proximately causes the death of any person, whether
they were the recipient of the delivery or not.189 Under the current interpretation of the statute, the deliverer of the controlled substance would be liable even if the deceased used the controlled substance to commit suicide or
died from an allergic reaction.190 It seems unlikely the original drafters of
the Drug-Induced Homicide Statute intended for this outcome without specifying their intent for a proximate cause theory to apply within the statute.191 Without clear language or reasonable inferences that could be made
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2011).
See Ervin, 577 A.2d 1273.
See Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
Id.; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 646/55 (2010).
See Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
See id.
See id.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
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from the current way the statute is written, it should be held unconstitutional for being overly vague.192
This does not mean drug-induced homicide should necessarily be
completely scrapped from Illinois’s Criminal Code.193 After all, the intent
and desire to curb deaths resulting from the delivery of controlled substances is still as prevalent today as in the 1980s.194 It is this author’s opinion
that Pennsylvania’s statute and its interpretation by its courts is the best
amongst all the states, including Illinois’s statute, because it clearly and in a
straightforward manner explains the elements of the crime and contains a
clear mens rea requirement of malice.195 This will cause some separation
from the strict liability and felony murder interpretations that increase punishment for an identical crime simply because someone died as a result of
the delivery, but still allow increased punishment beyond the mere delivery
of a controlled substance when the deliverer is acting with malice or with
knowing or purposeful intent that leads to the death of another.196
Furthermore, revising the current Illinois statute, would allow the public to fully understand the potential consequences of their actions, whereas
with the current interpretation it is unlikely an ordinary person would visualize the connection between Illinois’s proximate cause theory found in
felony murder with the necessary culpability for drug-induced homicide.197
Therefore, one of two solutions should be taken by Illinois’s courts: (1)
hold the current version of the law unconstitutional and leave it up to the
legislature to decide the requisite mens rea with regards to the death occurring from the delivery of an illegally controlled substance,198 or (2) follow
the holding of Illinois v. Gean to proscribe a mens rea to the statute of recklessness or above (i.e., knowledge or intent).199 Either of these two solutions
would be vastly superior to the current illogical interpretation of Illinois’s
Drug-Induced Homicide Statute.200 By addressing the lacking mens rea
element, by either solution, the Illinois courts can ensure the Illinois Drug192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Jessica Reichert, Prescription Drug Abuse, Accidental Overdose on Rise in
Illinois, 8 ILL. CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTHORITY RES. BULL., June 2011, at 1, 3 (stating that
unintentional drug overdoses have increased forty-nine percent between 1999 and 2007).
195. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2011); Pennsylvania v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005). See also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
196. See, e.g., Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623; Illinois v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005); State v. Ervin, 577 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
197. See Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367.
198. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
199. Illinois v. Gean, 573 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ill. 1991) (stating when an Illinois statute
does not prescribe a mental state within its own language either intent, knowledge, or recklessness applies).
200. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2011).
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Induced Homicide Statute does not encroach on the public’s right to have
fair and equitable laws that are reasonably understandable.201
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201. See id.
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